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LAW AND CONSCIENCE
The juxtaposition of law and conscience gives rise to two distinct problems:
the protection of conscience by the existing law and the creation of new law
through conscience. In both instances we mean by the term "law" the law
and the legal order as recognized by a politically organized society, or perhaps
the "officially" enforced and enforceable norms for human relations. This
juxtaposition, however, also brings to the fore the connection between conscience
and a suprahuman law: that is, the law of nature through which conscience
has been placed in man, indeed the law of God Who infused conscience in
human nature. In the present study the legal aspects of the first two problems
arising from the juxtaposition will be discussed; nonetheless, the relationship
of conscience to legal facts cannot be totally isolated from the question concern-
ing the origin of conscience. At the very least we must consider whether and
to what extent the origin influences the concept of conscience when it is ex-
amined in the context of law.
This particular examination leads to the very heart of the problem: what
is "conscience" as the term is used in domestic and international rules for be-
havior? The following are instances of such use:
Paragraph IX of the Introduction to the Agreement of October 18, 1907,
concerning Land War Laws and Customs (i.e., the land war regulations of the
Hague Constitutional Treaty) states that in the absence of specific regulation,
and for the interpretation of Articles I and II of the Land War Regulations,
the following are to be applied: Les lois de l'humaniti et des exigences de la
conscience publique (the laws of humanity and thedemands of public conscience).
In Article IX of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Constitutional Liberties (November 4, 1950), published (August 7, 1952) as
Federal Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, it is provided:
Everyone has a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This
right comprises the freedom of the individual to change his religion or his
Weltanschauung, as well as the freedom to exercise his religion or
Weltanschauung, singly or together with others, publicly or privately, by
means of worship, instruction, and through the exercise and observation of
religious usages. In a democratic society freedom of religion and of religious
worship may not be limited unless by law, and then only in the interest of
public safety, public order, health, morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedom of others. 1
This idea is reiterated by Article 4 of the Bonner Grundgesetz Constitutional
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23, 1949:
Freedom of religion and of conscience, and freedom to profess religious and
philosophical convictions are inviolable. Unmolested exercise of one's religion
1. 2 BUNDESOESETZBLATT 685, 953.
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is guaranteed. No one may be compelled to bear arms in time of war con-
trary to his conscience. Details are to be regulated by Federal Law.
2
The various State constitutions of Western Germany contain similar provisions.
For example, Article 107, paragraph 1 of the Bavarian Constitution of De-
cember 2, 1946, provides that "freedom of belief and of conscience is guar-
anteed."
These few examples indicate that two concepts of conscience must be dis-
tinguished. The constitutional regulations of West Germany provide for the
protection of conscience. The Hague Land War Regulations stress the fact
that humanity and the demands of conscience are the foundations of law.
I
The protection of the freedom of conscience through law and public policy
as expressed in the above-mentioned laws, especially in Article 4, Section I of
the Grundgesetz,3 and even more so in the highly detailed provisions of Article 9
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and of Basic Liberties
(Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und der Grundfreiheiten) of
November 4, 1950, should make plain the historical connections between freedom
of conscience, freedom of belief, and freedom of religion. But for modem human
relationships the historical connection is not enough. The freedom of religion
and religious worship is simply taken for granted in that it serves the preserva-
tion of human dignity. Less obvious, however, is the application of this freedom
to minors or children, especially in regard to parental decisions concerning the
religious or secular education of their children.4 Such decisions, which are
motivated by considerations of onscience, have been widely discussed. 5
The protection of conscience is also significant in numerous human relation-
ships where persons in authority demand acts that are contrary to individual
conscience and conviction. A nurse, for instance, for reasons of conscience refuses
to give a dying patient certain medication prescribed by the physician in order
to shorten his sufferings and his life. This nurse must be protected against being
dismissed for insubordination, as must the hospital pharmacist who for the same
reason refuses to sell contraceptives. The owner of a movie house who refuses
to fulfill a contract to show, as part of a series, a film which violates his con-
science, likewise must be protected. In all such cases the state courts will have
to provide protection for the individual, whether by denying the right of the
2. This provision was also incorporated as paragraph 25 of the Military Service Law of
June 21, 1956.
3. Hereafter cited as GG.
4. Most of these problems have arisen in connection with "parochial" or "state" schools.:
5. Concerning the several problems arising from the German Concordat of 1933 and
especially from the Catholic School issue, see the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(Federal Constitutional Court) of March 26, 1957. 6 ENTSCHEIDUNOEN DEs BUNDESVERFAS-
SUNOSOESUCHTs 310 (this is subsequently cited as BVERFGE). For survey of the
criticisms of this decision together with some indications as to the possible future develop-
ment of this question, see Freiherr von der Heydte, Die Katholische Kirche in Deutschland
und das Konkordatsurteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ZEITSCHIFT FUR POLITIK 203
(1957).
NATURAL LAW FORUM
employer to dismiss, or by interpreting certain contracts in a manner which
accords with constitutional rights. Modem legal developments tend to recognize
constitutional rights of the individual not only as against the state but also as
against other individuals or citizens.0
The concept of conscience as it is used in these provisions is not meant to
be an objective, but obviously a subjective, standard. Protection, therefore, is
accorded the freedom of man's individual, subjective conscience, even when
his conscience, viewed from the higher point of view of theological or ethical
teachings, is based on erroneous judgment. Man possesses an "internal" imme-
diate relationship to the world of values. Inside himself, within his own "self,"
man may intuitively attain to the world of values and ideas, and no power may
gainsay him. This individual faculty or power, given to man by nature, con-
stitutes the natural boundaries of the state and, at the same time, proclaims man's
right to freedom of conscience. This freedom yields a certain minimum guar-
antee for the unhampered exercise of one's conscience - a sort of "conscience-
minimum." It safeguards legally man's freedom to raise himself in his inner-
most mind, his "self," to the world of values, and to think, feel, will and judge
in accordance with his immediate personal relationship to values. Man is even
free to consult with his conscience about conscience and to imagine the meaning
and origin of conscience in accordance with his personal thinking and feeling.
The advantage inherent in this guaranteed "conscience-minimum" is easily
overlooked, especially by those people who insist that man carries in himself
a self-evident realization of a tribunal from which there is no appeal. This
tribunal spontaneously announces itself in his soul through an inner voice which
warns him against evil and calls upon him to do good, and either precedes,
accompanies, or follows an evil deed with pangs of conscience. The fact of this
"voice of conscience" cannot be disputed even among those who dispute the
origin of conscience7 (God, synderesis,S value systems).9 And this fact furnishes
6. See G. KiUCHENHOFF and E. KiCHENHOFF,ALLOEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 36-37 (3rd ed.).
7. See ROMANO GUARDINI, DAS GUTE, DAs GEWISSEN UND DIE SAMMLUNO (Mainz,
1929); VICTOR E. FRANKL, DER UNBEWUSSTE GOTT (2nd ed., 1949). Franld's critical
"existential analysis" is directed against Freud, by whom man is comprehended as an
automaton and human existence as "driven-ness" or "impulse." (p. 13) Frankl develops
the unconscious spiritual element in "depth psychology." (p. 33ff.) He discovers man's con-
science in the realm of the irrational and the intuitive, unfathomable in its decrees and
anticipating reality in the concept of what ought to be done. (pp. 39 ff.) Compare, on the
other hand, IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN (ed. Vorlinder) Hauptstuck 2,
Abschnitt 1, paragraph 13, where at first, to be sure (p. 289), conscience is designated as
"the consciousness of an inner court," but later as "an original intellectual and moral
(because it carries the idea of duty) inclination." (p. 290) Its unintentional effects are
described by Kant as follows:
Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and generally
disciplined (esteem linked to fear) by an inner judge. This power in man, which
guards the laws, is not something that he does for himself voluntarily, but is part
of his essence and being. It follows him like his shadow when he seeks to flee it.
So far as the origin of this conscience is concerned, Kant considers God only a necessity of
practical reason, because in this court called man's conscience "the defendant and the
judge cannot be imagined as one and the same person." Therefore, he says, "conscience
must be thought of as a subjective principle of man's responsibility for his actions before
God." (p. 290 ff.)
8. See Oskar Renz, Die Synderesis nach dem hi. Thomas von Aquin, 10 BEITRXOE ZUR
GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE DES MITTELALTERS 1-240 (ed. Biiumker, 1911). For ad-
GUYNTHER KtYCHENHOFF 123
a basis for the concept of conscience in the law. This concept of a "conscience-
minimum" should also disprove all those who denounce conscience as a weak-
ling's imagination (Nietzsche),10 or perhaps as a mere "recall" to original guilt
essential to the essence of man (Heidegger).11
Conscience is neither an artificially induced or imaginary phenomenon, nor
an obscure self-reference. Rather, it is a real psychic phenomenon which be-
comes manifest in man's relation to God, to absolute values, and to his fellow
man, and thus fulfills the ultimate meaning of human existence.
The concept of "conscience-minimum" also plays a decisive role in the ad-
ministration of criminal law in West Germany.12 The Bundesgerichtshof [Fed-
eral Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal Laws] for West Germany in its de-
cision of March 18, 1952,13 used the following as the criterion for determining
the question of criminal responsibility in the case of mistake of law: Would
knowledge of the prohibitory norm have been possible if the person had made
a proper effort of conscience (Gewissensanspannung)? The Court stressed the
fact that
the realization of doing wrong may in certain circumstances be lacking even
in a person of sound mind because he either does not know or else misjudges
the prohibitory standard. In such case of error, a person is not in a position
to decide against wrongdoing. But not every error as to the law excludes
criminal guilt. Up to a certain degree, at least, lack of knowledge is recti-
fiable.
The Court also pointed out that
in everything he is about to do, man has a duty of becoming aware of the
fact that his action should be in harmony with the legal precept. It is his
ditional bibliographical information, see id. at 238-40. Compare JOHANNES MxCHsAEL
HOLLENBACH, SEIN UND GEWisSEN 330 ff. (1954). For the linguistic root of the concept
(derived from vvPrqpetP: to preserve oneself - further conceptualized into preservation of
the remainder of man's originally good nature, left over after the Fall) see Jahnel, Woher
stammt der Ausdruck Synderesis bei den Scholastikern?, THEOLOGISCHE QUARTALSCHRIFT
241 ff.; 250 f. (1870).
9. See, for instance, NxcoL.ur HARTMANN, ETHIK 134 ff. (3rd ed., Berlin, 1949). For the
problem of the conflict of conscience, including an excellent presentation and grouping of
the various dogmas, consult FRITZ PUSTET, GEwiSSENSKONFLIKT UND ENTSCHEmUNO
(Regensburg, 1955). Pustet himself, by achieving an "ethics of critical realism," rises
beyond the "material value ethics" of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, as well as
beyond the theories of Hans Driesch and Aloys Wenzel. In this system a highest value is
established in the final goal toward which all existence is striving. Hence conscience is
derived from its ultimate origin: God. For details see PUSTET, op. cit. at 65 if., 76 if., 91
ff., 114 ff., 147 ff., and especially the final chapter.
10. See especially NIETZSCHE, 2 ZUR GENEALOGIE DER MORAL 16 and id. at 20-1. For
an analysis of the "conscience in Nietzsche's philosophy" see the Zilrich dissertation of that
title by Stefan Sonns, which brings valuable insights into the concept of conscience and
its development in Nietzsche.
11. See especially SEIN UND ZEIT section 2, chapter 2 (6th ed., Tiibingen, 1949). For
a critique of Heidegger, see HOLLENBACH, op. cit. supra note 8, at 317.
12. For Austrian law, see the author's Der Normenirrtum, FESTSCHRIPT FUR THEODOR
RITTLER 195 ff. (Innsbruck).
13. 2 ENTSCHEIDUNOEN DES BUNDESOERICHTSHOFS IN STRAFSACHEN 194, 201. (This is
hereafter cited as BGHST.)
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duty to overcome doubts by thorough reflection or inquiry. For this he
must resort to an effort of conscience (Anspannung des Gewissens), and the
degree to which he must do so is to be determined by the particular circum-
stances of the case as well as by the social and educational status of the
individual. If in spite of the effort of conscience which may properly be
expected of him he was unable to realize the unlawfulness of his action, his
error may be deemed insurmountable and his conduct unavoidable. This
being so, the question of his guilt cannot be properly raised. If, on the other
hand, he would have been able to recognize the unlawfulness of his action
by a proper effort of conscience on his part, his error or ignorance does not
exclude his guilt. But his guilt is lessened to the degree to which he did make
the effort of conscience.
In the past the Court has consistently relied upon these principles.14 But in a
more recent decision 15 it abandoned its former doctrine of the "indivisibility"
of man's awareness of committing a wrongful act.' 0 In doing so the Court
deliberately rejected the Anglo-American legal role that a person is considered
criminally responsible if "there is an intent to commit a crime," that is, that
the intent need not necessarily be directed towards the particular object that
has actually been "injured."' 7 The Court points out that neither the general
awareness of doing something wrong, nor the particular awareness of wrong-
fulness, if related to a nonanticipated factual situation, justifies us in finding
a person guilty for having brought about the nonanticipated situation. A gen-
eral relationship to a legally protected interest - in other words, a general
knowledge or knowability on the part of a person that a violation of this partic-
ular interest is prohibited by law - is not sufficient to find him guilty. These
principles in the case of error or ignorance as to certain legal prohibitions,
principles which are closely connected with the problem of conscience, are given
much attention in the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof as well as in labor law
and civil law.1S
The importance of man's personal conscience finds its fullest expression in
the application of legal norms. The court, to be sure, retains its dominant role
in declaring the (objective) law. But the individual's personal decision, based
on the conscientious choice, may conflict with the opinion of the court. In
such a case the individual prevails over the court, and his conduct is "guiltless."
In disagreeing with the law as propounded by the court, the individual puts
himself outside the generally accepted legal or moral principles of his time, or
perhaps outside those precepts which are founded in the natural law or in the
Decalogue. Even in the domain of the criminal law the State, when confronted
with a genuine question of conscience, may no longer simply or blindly enforce
"the legal order" or generally agreed upon legal norms. It may not blindly de-
14. Compare 3 BGHST 105 if; 400 ff. Id. at 5 BGHST 284 ff. Id. at 7 BGHST 17 ff.;
261 ff. Id. at 8 BGHST 324 ff.; 358 ff.
15. 10 BGHST 35 ff.
16. 3 BGHST 342 ff.
17. 10 BGHST 39.
18. Alfred Hueck in his notes to the basic decisions of the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal
Labor Court) of September 15, 1954, in A .BErrsPECHTLICHE PPAxis 1954, no. 1, 2,
dealing with paragraph 66 of the Betriebsvefassungsgesetzes. Compare also BAOE, 3
AuTLICHE SAMMLUNO, DER ENTSCHEIDUNOEN DES BuNDESABEITSGERCHTS 287.
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cide against an individual who, after a careful "conscientious effort," holds an
opinion which is contrary to the "legal order."
We must not overlook the fact, however, that any true conscience is related
to or based upon some objective values. With the exception of the situation just
discussed (the case of a subjectively general error rather than a merely sub-
jectively individual error),19 this relation becomes evident particularly whenever
conscience demands proclamation or overt action - where freedom of con-
science, for example, manifests itself in the freedom to express one's opinion,
that is, freedom of speech. This freedom of speech is restricted in the constitu-
tion GG of the German Federal Republic, and these restrictions appear to be
natural limitations to freedom to exercise one's conscience as well.
According to Article 18 GG, the freedom to express one's opinion may not
be misused to overthrow or endanger the free democratic structure of the German
state. Constitutional law, in other words, does not grant the "scomers of free-
dom" the freedom to activate their scorn.
The right to express one's opinion freely, according to Article 5, paragraph
2 GG, is further restricted by general laws, such as bylaws for the protection of
minors, as well as by everyone's right to personal integrity and honor. Such re-
strictions may not forbid an expression of opinion "solely on account of its
ideological aim or purpose and the resultant ideological effects." For to do this
would be violative of the fundamental right to free expression as guaranteed by
Article 19, paragraph 2 GG. If a person, in expressing his opinion, makes a
conscientious decision based on his conviction or on his religious or political
belief, then he may not be placed in jeopardy as a citizen2O or suffer any dis-
crimination within the framework of private employment or of a civil service
relationship. The prohibition of any kind of discrimination on account of be-
lief, religious conviction, or political view, not only flows from the general
assumption of human equality expressed in Article 3 GG, but it is also essentially
related to the freedom of conscience guaranteed by the law. All men have an
equal right to exercise and proclaim the dictates of their conscience and to do
so without outside interference. This right grows out of the humanity of all
men, out of the fact that we all are human beings. Part of this "being a human
being" is man's relationship to the world of values, another part his power of
articulate expression. Out of all this emerges the right to speak out from the
abundance of the heart what conscience urges us to express.
Like all other expression in general, the expression of conscience as free ex-
pression of opinion is subject to the limitations of those laws which protect certain
interests other than the interest in free expression and free speech, including the
free utterances of the dictates of conscience. It is the state which must draw
the "correct boundaries,"21 that is, establish a balance of "conflicting interests."
This drawing of boundaries was effectuated in Article 18 GG which provides
that in case of conflict of interests, the interest of free expression must yield.
In addition, Article 21, paragraph 2 GG, which supplements Article 5 GG,
was upheld by the Bundesverjassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) in
19. See the author's work cited supra note 12.
20. See article 3, paragraph 3; article 33, paragraph 3, sentence 3 of the GG.
21. 1 ENTSCHEIDUNOEN DES BUNDESABEITSOERICHTS 194.
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its decision of August 17, 1956, outlawing the Communist Party of Germany
(KPD) : 22
If, on the one hand, the Grundgesetz recognizes the traditional democratic
freedoms which, among other matters, insist on the principle of tolerance
for all political parties, it does not go so far, on the other hand, as to renounce,
in a spirit of indifferentism, the enactment of and protection for its own value
system. It chooses from the pluralistic goals and values which are incorpo-
rated in the various political parties certain basic principles of governmental
structure. These, when they have once been declared valid by democratic
procedures, are recognized as absolute values and must therefore be resolutely
defended against all attack. Inasmuch as certain restrictions of the political
freedom of action claimed by the opponents of democracy are considered
necessary for defense of democratic values, such restrictions are considered
acceptable.2 3
Even according to Article 5 GG, the right to free expression of opinion is sub-
ordinated to those legally recognized and secured interests which are contained
in "general" laws, that is, in those laws which, although they are not (and
indeed may not be) directed expressly against the exercise of the right of free
speech, may (in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 2 GG), restrict the right
to free speech and utterance in the interest of some other legally recognized and
secured individual or social interest. Included in such general laws are provisions
arising under the police power of the various states. This was affirmed by the
Bundesgerichtshof in its decision of February 1, 1954,24 involving an order of
the Hessian Minister of the Interior prohibiting all solicitation to attend the
Communist-inspired "World Peace Festival for Youth and Students" (August
5-19, 1951) in East Berlin. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labor Court),
in a decision of December 3, 1954,25 involving the dismissal of a shop com-
mitteeman engaged in communistic agitation during working hours, stated that
among the "general laws" limiting the freedom of expression are also funda-
mental rules governing the broader human relationships and the basic regula-
tions of labor relations, including the duty to preserve industrial peace, as well
as the provisions against political agitation on the part of shop committeemen.
2 6
II
So far only the powers and limitations of the individual's personal conscience
in relation to public law have been considered. Here conscience has been re-
garded as man's inner or intuitive knowledge of good and evil. But the term
conscience is also 'used in the sense of con-scientia, that is, of a collective knowl-
edge of good and evil, referring, as it were, to the concepts of right and wrong
as conceived by a "collective legal consciousness." This other notion of con-
science is referred to in the term "conscience publique" of Article IX of the
22. 5 BVERFGE 137 ff.
23. Id. at 138-139.
24. 12 ENTSCHEMUNOEN DES BUNDESOERICHTSHOFS IN ZVILSACHEN 197 if.
25. Quoted in BAGE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 186 i.
26. Paragraph 51 of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz.
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Introduction to the Hague Land War Regulations, or in such terms as "political
conscience," "popular conscience," "European conscience," and "world con-
science." 27
Conscience in this second sense must be based on certain "value judgments"
which are "so commonly accepted that each person in his particular environ-
ment should be aware of the fact that they are shared by a large majority of
men." 2 8 Since only the individual man, but never the collective whole, is capa-
ble of rational thought, this kind of "corporative conscience" must not be identi-
fied with a collective knowledge, determined by a "dominant majority." One may
assume, therefore, a common conscience and determine its specific contents only
if one can establish the greatest possible community of content of conscience,
hereafter referred to as "conscience-maximum."
First to be considered here are certain values2 9 which, so to speak, are related
to or based upon conscientious motivation and are recognized as having a real
efficacy. These values have asserted themselves in human society during a given
era and have been acknowledged as a part of generally agreed-upon cultural goals
as well as cultural achievements. Such values in our Western or Christian culture
are the Good, the Beautiful, the True, and the Holy.
To these may be added the principles of natural law; the Decalogue; such
principles as neminem laedere, neminem violare; suum cuique, pacta sunt
servanda; the principle of contradiction, non licit venire contra factum proprium;
submission to proper authority; the right to human existence and human free-
dom, a right which is derived from the fact of human existence in the context
of universal existence; man's right to formulate his specific human existence
as a conscious and voluntary act; the right to continued existence; and the right
to co-existence and social existence. 3 0 These rights and duties are founded in
man's nature, in the being and the "being together" of human beings. They
originate in the irreversible individuality of man, but tend to objective moral
or legal orders and thus tend to overcome the specifically Western or occidental
dualism between objective and subjective values or norms. Together with the
individual consequences deriving from the nature of law, from legal relationships,
27. See RUDOLF VON LAUN, DER WANDEL DER IDEEN STAAT UND VOLK ALS AUSSERUNO
DES WELTOEWISSENS. EINE VOLXER- UND STAATSRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNO AUF"
PHILOSOPHISCHER GRUNDLAGE 395; 427 ff.; 436 (Barcelona, 1933). Cf. Laun's commentary
on the HAGUE LAND WAR REGULATIONS (5th ed., Hannover, 1947), especially section 3, pp.
24 ff.; Laun, Zum Problem der Behandlung der nationalen Frage durch internationale
Organisation, in REcHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION (Festschrift for Hans
Wehberg's seventieth birthday), ed. by Walter Schlitzel und Hans-Jiirgen Schlochauer
(Frankfurt, 1956), especially 235-38 and 258. See also the profound and thorough exami-
nation of Laun's work by Arthur Wegner, who agrees with Laun on all essential points, in
ZEITSGHRIFT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT UND DIPLOMATIE 254-63 (1957).
28. Laun, op. cit. supra note 27 (Festschrift . . . ), at 236.
29. In addition to the works cited in note 9 supra, see also HEINICH RICKERT,
ALLOEMEINE GRUNDLEOUNG DER PHILOSOPHr 112 ff.; 121 ff.; 129 ff.; 171 ff.; 203 ff.
254 ff. (Tilbingen, 1921); and the author's essay, Die Stellung des Rechts im Weltganzen,
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE ARZTRECHT 197 ff. (Karlsruhe, 1952); and his
STAATSRECHT, ALLOEMEINER TEaL 8 (1951).
30. Compare G. KicHENHOFF and E. KlUcHENHOFF, ALLOEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 40 if.
(3rd ed., 1957); also M. E. Schmitt, Recht und Vernunft, 8 POLITEIA 120 (Freiburg-
Schweiz, 1955).
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from the "Natur der Sache" (Radbruch), these rights and duties contain certain
"directives," and often the specific content, for the concrete definition of a legal
conscience as it operates in the actuality of social relationships.
Viewed in this manner, natural law is both an ontological law and a standard
determining moral existence law and conscience law. This being so, it is capable
not only of formulating universally valid critera of the conscientious acts omit-
ted by individuals, groups, nations-in fact, by humanity as a whole- but
also of influencing the structure of international and public laws.
Finally, the commandment to love has been given to man, reaching all the
way from the biological laws of sex, through conjugal, parental, and filial love,
to that love of man which finds the fulfillment of all existence in the caritas
socialis.31 The meaning of human existence, which reveals itself in the love
of the other, finds expression in the law and in interhuman relations. This love
of the other which ultimately fosters a "sense for law and justice," manifests
itself between individuals in an attitude of decency and considerateness, and
between the state and the individual in a spirit of good will on the part of the
state towards the individual and his aspirations (Law of Love).3 This demand
of love and good will, which is revealed in the divine command to love God and
one's neighbor, cannot forever be ignored by man, at least not as a demand of
conscience. To conform to this demand and to translate it into action would be
the noblest task of law and legal policy. In this fashion would be built up a
Law of Love,83 in the sense of a legal system founded on love of neighbor.
III
Reference to a determination of law on the basis of human good will, no
less than the visible manifestations of human conscience, in the final analysis
compels us to reveal the ultimate source of conscience itself.
31. See POPE PIUS XI, ENZYKLIKA QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (May 15, 1931) final section;
and, forty years earlier (1891), LEO XIII, ENZYKLIKA RERUM NovARum, no. 19. For a
discussion of particulars in the development from "the justice of the common good," to
"social justice," see Utz, in the German-Latin edition (1953) of ST. THOMAS, 18 SUMMA
THROLOGICA 564 ff. (Law and Justice). According to No. 19 of RERUM NOVARUM, in the
case of "extreme necessity" there exists a legal obligation to love. This the author has
tried to point out in his work cited in note 32 infra at 75 ff. The problem of the caritas
socialis as well as that of social justice as the application of the highest ethical communal
good, see also the recent work of Utz, Socialethik, 10 POLITEIA 230 ff. (Freiburg-Schweiz,
1958).
32. In connection with this concept see the author's NATURR-CHT UND CHRISTENTUM 69
ff. (Duisseldorf, 1951); G. KL1CHENHOFF and E. KijCHENHOFF, ALLOEMEINE STAATSLEHRE
40-41; 60-61 (3rd ed., Stuttgart, 1957). The following authors are in agreement with
Kfichenhoff: JOSEF FuNx, PRIMAT DES NATURRECHTS 63 ff.; 334 (Wien, 1952); ALBERT
AUER, DER MENSCeH HAT RECHT. NATURRECHT AUF DEM HINTERORUND DES HEUTE
121 f. (Verlag Styria, Graz, 1956) ; Erik Wolf, Rechts des Nchsten. Ein rechtstheologischer
Entwurf, 15 PHILOSOPHISCHEN ABHANDLUNGEN 18 ff.; 24 ff.; 28 ff. (1958).
33. From a purely scientific point of view it seems to be a matter of international con-
cern to examine the command of love in its various religious and philosophical implica-
tions, and to study its effect on law. It is possible, after all, that the law of the state is
colored, in fact planned and formed, not only and everywhere by power (whatever the
current ruling majority group may be) but often enough by well-wishing and humane
considerations.
GONTHER KVCHENHOFF
In order to answer the question concerning the origin of conscience, we
must make use of the old scholastic concepts of synderesis and syneidesis as they
have been coined and used by St. Jerome and later developed by St. Albert the
Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. The concept of synderesis comprises man's
entire spiritual and ethical "habit" which enables him to recognize and will the
good, insofar as he has retained such capacity after the Fall. Hence, synderesis
is "the spirit of man as it inclines to good and abhors evil." Let us cite the
decisive words of Albert the Great:
Cum enim homo per peccatum corruptus fuit, in naturalibus non adeo fuit
corruptus, quod nihil maneret integrum, ergo in singulis viribus manet
aliquid rectum, quod in judicando et appetendo concordat rectitudini
primae, in qua creatus est homo . . . . cum ergo hoc sit officium synderesis
in homine, synderesis est rectitudo manens in singulis viribus concordans
rectitudini primae.3 4
Hollenbach illustrates this inherent "moral potency" which, together with the
"habitus" of practical moral principles, constitutes synderesis.
It [the "potency"] must be a capacity which underlies habitus. If reason in its
passive power is the seat of the habitus, it cannot itself underlie this habitus.
And if the active power of reason divulges the existence of the habitus as
such, then it too cannot underlie it. Hence the only "potency" which can
possibly underlie the habitus is the will, insofar as this will, in experiencing
its moral freedom and in its natural and general striving after the good, by
way of a knowledge of the existence of God, tends towards complete surrender
to God. The principles of natural law, therefore, have their ultimate roots
in the realization that I, as a limited free being, must be a product of the
unlimited free creator. The recognition of God's existence would thus be the
habitus principiorum operabilium to which the will is subjected. It is this
recognition of God's existence which immediately and personally, through
my free will, makes certain definite demands upon me. Thus synderesis
could be defined as the basic tendency of "passion" of the will, formed as
well as directed by the knowledge of God through the natural powers of
reason.3 5
This synderesis is also the basis of the syneidesis, and syneidesis is man's moral
conscience having decided in favor of the good.
' Conscience, built upon synderesis, in its essential conduct, which comprises
the total human being, is thus directed towards the good. In so doing, it strives
toward harmony with God. Romano Guardini has set this forth impressively
in his book, Das Cute, das Gewissen und die Sammlung. According to
Guardini, conscience "means knowledge - of oneself, and before God - of the
Good, as the demand of God's holiness; it means the understanding, - of oneself,
and before God, in the light of each situation as it occurs -of the Good, as an
ordinance of God's Providence." 3 6
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We may summarize as follows: 37 The impulses of man's moral conscience
spring directly from the act of the synderesis. This act is "the struggle against
evil through inclination towards the good." The capacity 'freely to oppose evil
rests upon God. Hence, conscience, the good, and God stand inseparably linked.
It may be that in our own time this lofty concept of conscience transcends
the conscience-maximum which we may possibly expect from man, i.e., the
utmost harmony in the varying concepts of conscience which may conceivably
be achieved. On the other hand, it is of utmost importance for law and politics
to rise above mere sporadic manifestations of individual conscience in the domain
of law and justice, and to tackle the problem in its totality. This totality is God,
Who, through man's conscience, speaks to individuals as well as to those men
who are responsible for the legal or political ordering of nations, including the
organization of many nations. Only by visualizing this totality can we conscienti-
ously and successfully manage to solve the problems of law with which we are
faced.
Thus, what does it really mean when in Article 2, no. 2 of the Charter of
the United Nations of June 26, 1945, the members of the organization are re-
quested to "comply in good faith" - "remplir de bonne foi" - with those duties
that had been commonly agreed upon? It can only mean that the fulfillment of
such duties will be in a manner that accords with the concept of conscience and,
at the same time, is mindful of the origin of conscience.3 8
A legal system based upon or rooted in conscience acquires additional signifi-
cance in a "space age"; e.g., in the light of such possibilities as "space stations,"
landing strips on the moon, and the like, where the question of "national control"
may arise. The necessity may also arise in the determination of municipal and
international legal problems connected with the assignment of a definite strato-
spheric orbit of different earth satellites. Since in the stratospheric domain human
influence is still partially felt, the latter may be designated as the cosmic sphere
of man's influence. But in the case of a space ship moving freely beyond the
gravitational pull of the earth, or in the case of the establishment of a so-called
outer-space station, or of a landing on the moon, a new and comprehensive
concept of sovereignty is proposed here: the cosmic sphere of legal sovereignty.
Such spheres of cosmic influence and sovereignty are subject to human regulation.
The attempt of man to penetrate into outer space is by no means to be rejected
as mere hybris or, perhaps, as an "act against nature" and, hence, as wrong.
By penetrating outer space man obeys the divine command to conquer the
earth.3 9 This command refers not only to our planet, but to the whole universe
over which man may gain sovereignty. The entering of outer space is therefore
subject to law and the legal order. To be sure, we will not be able to use here
our traditional legal rules of discovery or first occupancy. For these were made
for our earth, not for outer space: they refer to objects devoid of dominium,
not to objects which hitherto could not possibly have been subject to dominium.
Hence, in outer space we cannot legally operate with the principle of res nullius
cedet occupanti.
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Whenever we get away from the well-trodden paths of traditional legal prob-
lems, we are compelled more and more to rely on moral conscience when framing
vital legal relationships. Man's penetration of space, together with its inevitable
concomitant of cosmic legislation, compels us to fall back on the command of
humility,40 which is bound up with the command to conquer and rule. We
shall have to adjust ourselves more perfectly to the divine order of life as well as
of the universe, and hence abide by the commands to love God and our neighbor.
Cosmic law, even more than earthly law, will therefore have to be the law of
conscience and the law of love. Man's ascent to highest outward sovereignty
must keep pace with his duty to inwardly profoundest obedience to God and
His command to love.
Such thoughts permit us to draw certain practical conclusions which may
serve not only for the philosophical understanding of law, but also to produce
concretely effective law. Whenever an individual, or perhaps the delegate of
a national state, ascends into outer space, there ascends with him the whole of
mankind. For the whole of mankind thinks with him, feels with him, participates
in his venture, and is interested (in the original sense of the word). In other
words, the whole of humanity is, so to speak, represented in outer space by an
individual delegate who, in this case, acts as a part of humanity, or, lacking the
will to represent, at least embodies the principle of the singleness of humanity.
Hence, all scientific discoveries - in fact, any advance in human knowledge
that might be connected in outer space - belong not to the single occupying
individual, but to all of humanity, including humanity's various national organiza-
tions and their members.
No state would be justified, if it should succeed in reaching the moon, in
excluding "later arrivals" or in preventing other states and their messengers from
landing. A cosmic occupation, on the other hand, is possible. If a state estab-
lishes a sort of definite, spatially limited sovereignty in outer space, such as the
orbit of a satellite, and particularly if it is able to control the duration and reg-
ularity of this orbit, no other state may, through its representatives, interfere
with it or seek to influence it. If a space station were created by a particular
national state, others may use it only by agreement, though they could anticipate
this consent, provided there is sufficient room so as not to endanger the landing
surface. Cosmic occupation, in other words, provides the individual national
state or union of states with a right to regulate, but not a right to establish abso-
lute sovereignty. In short, it grants him the position of an executor for the whole
of humanity, to be held in humility, considerateness, and the will to serve the
advancement of all mankind.
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